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A Model of Non-Informational Preference
Change
Franz Dietrich and Christian List
July 20, 2009
Abstract
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in po-
litical science and economics, an agents fundamental preferences are
exogenously xed, and any preference change over decision options is
due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimo-
nious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by ex-
periences or psychological changes distinct from information learning.
We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alter-
natives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only
some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agents prefer-
ences. Any change in these motivationally salient dimensions can
change the agents preferences. How it does so is described by a new
representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of
frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard
representations of preferences in political science and economics.
F. Dietrich, University of Maastricht and LSE; C. List, LSE. This paper was pre-
sented at the Choice Group seminar, LSE, 1/2009, the Preference Change Workshop,
LSE, 5/2009, the 3rd Workshop on Decisions, Games and Logic, HEC Lausanne, 6/2009,
and the 6th Conference of the Society for Economic Design, Maastricht, 6/2009. We are
grateful to the participants at these events for comments and discussion.
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1 Introduction
According to standard models of rational choice, there is no such thing as
genuine preference change. A rational agent has xed preferences over funda-
mental alternatives or outcomes, such as fully described states of the world,
and any observed changes in his or her preferences over less fundamental
alternatives, such as policy options, are purely information-driven: They are
due to the fact that the agent has learnt new information about which fun-
damental outcomes are likely to result from those options. In this way, the
same fundamental preferences, together with new information, lead to revised
preferences at the less fundamental level. This theoretical picture is certainly
elegant and parsimonious, and although it has become increasingly common
in the social sciences to criticize the assumption of exogenously xed pref-
erences(e.g., Dryzek 1992, Green and Shapiro 1994), its explanatory power
should not be underestimated (e.g., Friedman 1996).
Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that there are instances of preference
change which standard rational choice theory has di¢ culties explaining in a
natural way. Sometimes agents do undergo transformations that go beyond
information learning in any ordinary sense. Imagine, to give some particu-
larly sharp examples, a capitalist businessman who, after surviving a plane
crash, decides to devote his life to charity; a workoholic who, after experienc-
ing an illness, changes his or her priorities in life; or an ageing person whose
physiological changes quite apart from the wisdom of agea¤ect his or her
lifestyle and preferences. Or imagine someone with racist preferences who,
after bonding with a new neighbour of a di¤erent racial background, gives
up his or her racism. To suggest that such changes are solely the result of
information learnt from the plane crash, from the illness, from ageing or from
bonding with the neighbour seems an unsatisfactory explanation. Something
more fundamental appears to be going on here. This raises the question of
whether standard rational choice theory can be generalized so as to account
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for the possibility of more fundamental changes of preference, while retain-
ing, as far as possible, the theorys elegance and parsimony. Our aim in this
paper is to propose such a generalization and thereby to contribute to the
foundations of rational choice theory in political science and economics.
The key idea is that the alternatives over which agents have preferences
such as states of the world, policy platforms, candidates, consumer goods
etc.  can be characterized along several dimensions, only some of which
typically play a role in shaping the agents preferences. We call these the
motivationally salient dimensions. For example, a voter may form his or
her preferences over policy platforms just on the basis of a conventional
socio-economic left-right dimension and ignore their locations on a second,
religious-secular dimension, or on a third, urban-rural dimension. Similarly,
an ordinary person may form preferences over di¤erent kinds of wine just
on the basis of whether those wines are red or white, sweet or dry, cheap or
expensive, but be oblivious to the more subtle characteristics that the wine
connoisseur appreciates. When some of these further dimensions become
salient for the agent, his or her preferences can change.
A change in an agents set of motivationally salient dimensions can be
triggered by external experiences or by internal psychological or physiological
changes of the agent. It is distinct from learning new information. It cannot
be identied, for instance, with learning where alternatives are located on
the various dimensions. In our examples, the voter may always have been
abstractly aware of the existence of the religious-secular and urban-rural
dimensions of policies, and yet not have been motivated by them; and the
wine drinker may always have had some information about a wines acidity
and oak, and yet not have been moved by these more subtle characteristics.
On our proposal, what happens when the agents set of motivationally salient
dimensions changes is simply that di¤erent dimensions attain force in shaping
his or her preferences. There need not be any change in the agents beliefs
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about the locations of the alternatives on those dimensions, or about anything
else.
Our claim that a change in the motivational salience of dimensions cannot
generally be reduced to information learning is further reinforced by the
possibility that such a change, unlike the acquisition of information, can
go in two directions: New dimensions may become motivationally salient,
while others may cease to be so. For example, a poor person who gradually
becomes richer may be infected with what is sometimes called a­ uenza
and no longer care about the poverty-related characteristics of alternatives,
while suddenly paying great attention to the luxury-related ones. All this
is entirely consistent with the agents retaining all the factual information
about poverty that he or she had before. The resulting preference change is
hard to model in ordinary informational terms.1
In our new model, alternatives are represented by points in some multi-
dimensional space and an agent forms his or her preferences over the alter-
natives on the basis of a particular set of dimensions that have motivational
salience for him or her. The agents preferences thus depend on the locations
of the alternatives on the motivationally salient dimensions, but not on their
locations on others. On this picture, a change in the motivational salience of
1A full discussion of whether preference change of the present kind could be remodelled
as information learning is beyond the scope of this paper. In ongoing work, we give detailed
(and largely negative) answers to this question, by providing microscopicfoundations for
our model. As presented here, the model is macroscopic, leaving open why a dimension
gains or loses motivational salience. This is intended for reasons of generality and parsi-
mony. Generality requires us not to single out any particular microscopicfoundation of
salience. A dimensions salience (or lack thereof) could stem from the nature of the agents
conceptualization, imagination or perception, to give just a few examples. Similarly, par-
simony is often best achieved by explaining phenomena at a particularly accessible level,
not necessarily the most fundamental one. Recall, for instance, how cooperative game
models describe decision making at a coalitional rather than individual level, even when
reductions to non-cooperative models are possible.
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some dimensions can induce a preference change.2
We prove a general representation theorem in this framework, showing
that, under some plausible conditions, the agents preferences are repre-
sentable by an additive utility function, according to which the utility of
each alternative is given by the sum of the values the agent assigns to its
location on each of the motivationally salient dimensions. This additive form
is consistent with many widely recognized types of preferences in political
and economic contexts, such as Euclidean and other distance-based prefer-
ences in spatial voting theory and Cobb-Douglas and constant-elasticity-of-
substitution preferences in the theory of consumer choice and beyond, and
we give some simple illustrations. Finally, we discuss how uncertainty and
lack of information can be reintroduced into our model, so as to show that
our model properly generalizes a paradigmatic standard model of rational
choice, by capturing the possibility of non-informational as well as informa-
tional preference change.
Our approach sheds new light on a diverse set of social-scientic phe-
nomena ranging from fairly general phenomena such as preference change
as a result of new experiences or enhanced or diminished understanding
to explicitly political ones such as deliberation-induced preference change
(e.g., Miller 1992, Knight and Johnson 1994, Dryzek and List 2003, List,
Luskin, Fishkin and McLean 2000/2006) and Rikerian heresthetics (Riker
1986, McLean 2001), the art of political manipulation by leading voters to
reconceptualize the policy space in terms of di¤erent dimensions. Important
related works include Stigler and Beckers work on taste acquisition, accord-
ing to which an agents preference for listening to classical music, consuming
drugs, meeting friends etc. changes over time depending on past behaviour
2Another way to express this idea is to say that the agent views the space of alterna-
tives through a particular lense, focusing on the projection of the space into a particular
subspace rather than on the space as a whole, so that when the subspace in focus changes,
the agents preferences change accordingly.
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and experiences (e.g., Stigler and Becker 1977, Becker 1996); various au-
thorswork on the development or loss of other-regarding preferences such
as sympathy, hate, reciprocity or identication (e.g., Sen 1977, 1996, Rabin
1998, Fehr and Gaechter 1998, Sethi and Somanathan 2001, Falk and Fis-
chbacher 2006, Dietrich 2008); dynamic inconsistency in an agents choices,
which might be involved, for example, in the development of addictions (e.g.,
Strotz 1955-56, Hammond 1976); the endogenous determination of prefer-
ences and tastes by environmental factors such as government policies or
institutions (e.g., Polak 1976, Bowles 1998, Dietrich 2009); and the e¤ects
of issue framing on individual agency (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981,
Benford and Snow 2000, Gold and List 2004). Our model speaks in various
ways to each of the issues raised by these contributions, representing the
relevant concerns a¤ecting the agents preferences or tastes (such as certain
perceived characteristics of alternatives, the welfare of others etc.) in terms
of separate dimensions of the space of alternatives and suggesting that the
agents preference or taste change stems from a change in the salience of
these dimensions. Although our model allows a large number of extensions
and generalizations, we here aim to give a pedagogical introduction to the
central concepts and ideas, setting aside as many technicalities as possible.
2 Basic denitions
We consider an agents preferences over some set X of mutually exclusive
alternatives, for example states of the world, policy platforms, candidates,
consumer goods etc. As already indicated, we assume that the set of alter-
natives X is some multidimensional space, such as Rk, with k > 0. Each
alternative x 2 X can thus be written as a k-tuple x = (x1; x2; :::; xk), with
xj representing the jth characteristic of the alternative or its location on
dimension j. We write D = f1; 2; :::; kg to denote the set of dimensions.
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Although Rk is the standard example of a k-dimensional space, our model is
more general. Generally, we assume that X is of the form
X = X1 X2  :::Xk,
where each Xj is a connected topological space.3 The real line R or any
interval on the real line are the simplest instances of such spaces, but more
complex instances are also conceivable, and an individual dimensionXj could
even be internally multidimensional (e.g., be itself of the form R2 or R3 etc.).4
A set of motivationally salient dimensions is a subset S  D. Our aim
is to model how the agents preferences depend on the set S. We consider
a family of preference orders over the alternatives in X, consisting of one
preference order for each possible set of motivationally salient dimensions.
Interpretationally, the agent need not be and typically is not aware of
these preference orders except the one held under his or her current set of
motivationally salient dimensions. For each S  D, we writeS to denote the
agents preference order in the event that S is the set of motivationally salient
dimensions. As is conventional, S is dened as a reexive, transitive and
complete binary relation on X, and we further assume that S is continuous,
thus ruling out, for example, lexicographic preferences over X.5 We write
S and S to denote the strict preference order and the indi¤erence relation
induced by S, respectively.
3A topological space Xj is connected if it cannot be partitioned into two non-empty
open sets.
4In a companion paper, we address (among other things) the alternative case in which
some of the Xjs are discrete and thus do not constitute connected topological spaces. This
alternative case occurs, in particular, when some of the characteristics of the alternatives
are binary.
5Formally, S is continuous if, for all x 2 X, the sets fy 2 X : y S xg and fy 2
X : x S yg are both topologically closed. In our companion paper, we also discuss the
non-continuous case.
7
In the example of an election, the underlying set of dimensions D may in-
clude a socio-economic, a religious-secular and an urban-rural dimension, and
any subset S  D could be motivationally salient for a given voter, depend-
ing on which dimensions play a role in shaping his or her preferences. Some
voters may form their preferences solely on the basis of the socio-economic
dimension of policies, while others may also take into account other dimen-
sions. Similarly, in the case of wines, the underlying set of dimensions D may
include anything ranging from the white-red, sweet-dry and cheap-expensive
dimensions to those of oak and acidity etc. A wine drinkers set S of motiva-
tionally salient dimensions now contains precisely those dimensions that play
a role in shaping his or her preferences. In the case of a particularly inert
agent, it can even happen that the set of motivationally salient dimensions is
empty. How can we make the idea of motivational salience more precise? In
particular, what do we mean by saying that a dimension plays a role in shap-
ing the agents preferences? In the next section, we address these questions
in more detail.
3 General result
We introduce two axioms on the relationship between an agents set of mo-
tivationally salient dimensions and his or her preference order. The rst
captures the central idea that only the salient dimensions have any motiva-
tional force in shaping the agents preferences: Unless two alternatives are
distinct with respect to some of the motivationally salient dimensions, the
agent remains indi¤erent between them.
Axiom 1 Only salient dimensions motivate.For any two alternatives x; y 2
X and any set of motivationally salient dimensions S  D, if xS = yS, then
x S y.6
6For each x 2 X, we write xS to denote the subvector of x restricted to the dimensions
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The second axiom concerns the way in which the agents preferences re-
spond to gains or losses of motivationally salient dimensions. For pedagogical
purposes, it is useful to begin with a simple, albeit unnecessarily strong vari-
ant of the axiom, before stating the o¢ cialaxiom. The simple variant says
that the agents preference between any two alternatives may change when
an additional dimension becomes motivationally salient or when a previ-
ously salient dimension ceases to be so only if those two alternatives di¤er
on that dimension.
Axiom 2 (simple variant) Only dimensions on which there is a di¤er-
ence motivate. For any two alternatives x; y 2 X, any set of motiva-
tionally salient dimensions S  D and any other dimension j =2 S, if
x S y < x S[fjg y, then xj 6= yj.
The o¢ cial, weaker axiom says that, if every gain in motivationally
salient dimenions changes the preference between two given alternatives, then
those two alternatives must di¤er on at least one previously non-salient di-
mension: The preference change must stem from some such di¤erence.
Axiom 2 (o¢ cial variant) For any two alternatives x; y 2 X and any set
of motivationally salient dimensions S ( D, if x S y < x S[T y for
every non-empty set T  DnS, then xj 6= yj for some j 2 DnS.
Of course, a lot could be said about our two axioms. We can interpret
them either as substantive claims about how preferences are constrained
by the motivational salience of dimensions within an agent, or as formal
constraints on the correct demarcation of dimensions and the correct spec-
ication of the motivationally salient ones. The rst, substantive interpre-
tation requires that both preferences and motivational salience have some
in S  D. When S = ?, xS is the empty vector, and thus xS = yS for any x; y 2 X in
this case.
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independent psychological content preferences obviously as representations
of choice dispositions, and motivational salience as capturing some choice-
relevant features of the agents conceptualization, imagination or perception
of the alternatives inX. Once this psychological content is properly specied,
our two axioms become empirically testable (and we hypothesize: compelling)
claims about the relationship between preferences and motivational salience.
The second, formal interpretation of our axioms, by contrast, is consistent
with the pure representation-theoretic spirit of classical decision theory. Here
the satisfaction of the two axioms is taken to be a constraint on the correct
identication of dimensions and on the ascription of motivationally salient
ones to an agent. For example, if two alternatives coincide on all dimensions
in a given set S and yet the agent is not indi¤erent between them, contrary
to axiom 1, then S, on this interpretation, cannot be a correct specica-
tion of the agents set of motivationally salient dimensions. Instead, some
dimensions outside S must be motivationally salient as well. Similarly, if
the addition of one or several new dimensions to the set S always changes
the agents preference between x and y although x and y do not di¤er on
any new dimension, contrary to axiom 2, then we must have demarcated the
dimensions in D incorrectly. It may be necessary, for instance, to combine
one or several of the new dimensions with one or several of the existing di-
mensions into a single compositedimension to which the preference change
can be attributed. Di¤erent readers may favour di¤erent interpretations of
the axioms; for the purposes of this paper, however, we need not commit
ourselves to one interpretation.7
What is the consequence of these two axioms? Surprisingly, their joint
satisfaction ensures that the agents family of preference orders can be rep-
resented in an elegant and unied way.
7Recall the macroscopicnature of the present model, as explained in an earlier note.
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Theorem 1 Suppose there are three or more e¤ective dimensions in D.8
Then the agents preference orders S across all possible S  D satisfy ax-
ioms 1 and 2 if and only if there exist continuous value functions
v1 : X1 ! R, v2 : X2 ! R, ..., vk : Xk ! R such that, for any two al-
ternatives x; y 2 X and any set of motivationally salient dimensions S  D,
x S y ()
P
j2S
vj(xj) 
P
j2S
vj(yj).
A proof is given in the appendix. While the proof draws on classic charac-
terization results by Debreu (1960) and Wakker (1988), our theorem operates
in a completely di¤erent framework, in so far as it describes the properties
of an entire family of preference orders, and how they are constrained by the
motivational salience of dimensions, rather than just a single such order, as
in those classic results.9
Our theorem shows that, under the two axioms we have introduced, the
agents preferences are representable by an additive utility function, accord-
ing to which the utility of each alternative is the sum-total of its value(as
assessed by the agent) on all of the motivationally salient dimensions, but
not on other dimensions. Formally, for each S, the utility function is of the
form uS : X ! R, where, for each x 2 X,
uS(x) =
P
j2S
vj(xj).
8We call a dimension j 2 D e¤ective if fjg is not the all-indi¤erent order, i.e., if the
motivational salience of j alone lets the agent hold a strict preference between at least one
pair of alternatives in X.
9The strength of our characterization is nicely illustrated by the following simple combi-
natorial consideration. In the absence of our axioms, a family of preference orders (S)SD
(each continuous) is at best representable by 2k possible value functions(one for each
S  D), each of which, in turn, has k arguments (corresponding to the k dimensions of
X). Our result reduces this to a representation in terms of only k value functions, each
of which takes only one argument (corresponding to a single dimension of X).
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For each dimension j, the value function vj by which the agent assesses the
value of each alternative on dimension j can take a number of forms: It
may depend, for example, on the distance between the alternatives and some
ideallocation on dimension j; or it may involve a weighting of that distance
so as to amplify or reduce dimension js inuence compared with others; or it
may be an increasing function that assigns higher values to higher locations
on dimension j.10 In section 5 below, we illustrate how broadly applicable our
framework is, by showing that several common classes of preferences studied
in the social sciences are of the form described by theorem 1.
It is important to emphasize that, while our if and only ifresult requires
three or more e¤ective dimensions, the ifdirection also holds without this
restriction: Any additive utility function as just dened satises our two
axioms, regardless of how many or few e¤ective dimensions there are.
It is now transparent how our model can explain preference change:
Proposition 1 A change in the set of motivationally salient dimensions S
changes the function uS and the corresponding preference order S except in
the special case in which every added or removed salient dimension j has a
constant value function vj.
In the next section, we consider two concrete examples of preference
change driven by changes in the motivational salience of dimensions.
4 Two examples
Our rst example concerns a change in voter preferences. It is frequently
observed by political scientists that some of the most signicant changes
in voting behaviour in recent decades can be attributed to a change in the
10The functions v1, v2, ..., vn are unique up to positive a¢ ne transformations of the
form vj 7! vj + j , with a common scalar  > 0 for all j.
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salient political dimensions. In a study of partisan realignment, Miller and
Schoeld (2003), for example, observe that [p]arty voting in 1960 was still
primarily driven by the economic cleavage of the New Deal. Income and
class variations were strong predictors of individual voting behavior, with
middle-class and professional homeowners voting Republican and working-
class union members voting Democratic... By 2000, however, the New Deal
party alignment no longer captured patterns of partisan voting. In the in-
tervening 40 years, the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts had triggered
an increasingly race-driven distinction between the parties. Discussing the
work of Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989),
Miller and Schoeld further point out that racial issues had become the
dominent cleavage in American politics, driving out class-based voting, and
that racial polarities had come to subsume a variety of other social issues as
well, including abortion, womensrights, and prayer in schools.This change
in the motivationally salient political dimensions led to a noticeable change
in voter preferences: Several states that were predominantly Democratic in
1960 became Republican in 2000 and vice-versa.
To give a simplied illustration of the mechanism underlying such a prefer-
ence change, consider the two-dimensional space shown in Figure 1, with two
displayed alternatives, x and y, and a voter with an attributed ideal point.
Dimension 1 might represent the conventional socio-economic left-right di-
mension, while dimension 2 might represent a social valuesdimension. We
assume that, for each dimension j, the voters value function vj on locations
on that dimension is simply given by the negative value of the distance from
the voters ideal location on that dimension (we could take the square of that
value if we wanted to capture Euclidean distance in the underlying space R2,
but the present simpler denition is su¢ cient to make the point we dis-
cuss more general distance-based preferences in section 5). Let us begin by
considering the case in which only dimension 1 is motivationally salient for
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Figure 1: Voter preferences
the voter, i.e., S = f1g. Clearly, x is closer to the voters ideal point on
dimension 1 than y is, i.e.,
ji1   x1j < ji1   y1j,
and therefore
uS(x) = v1(x1) =  ji1   x1j >  ji1   y1j = v1(y1) = uS(y),
whence x S y.
By contrast, if only dimension 2 is motivationally salient, i.e., S = f2g,
we nd that y is closer to the voters ideal point on dimension 2 than x is,
i.e.,
ji2   y2j < ji2   x2j,
which implies
uS(y) = v2(y2) =  ji2   y2j >  ji2   x2j = v2(x2) = uS(x),
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and thus y S x. This shows that a change in the set of motivationally salient
dimensions from S = f1g to S = f2g can lead to a preference reversal between
x and y. Moreover, in the case in which both dimensions are motivationally
salient, i.e., S = f1; 2g, we also nd that y S x, since
uS(y) = v1(y1) + v2(y2) = ( ji1   y1j) + ( ji2   y2j)
> ( ji1   x1j) + ( ji2   x2j) = v1(x1) + v2(x2) = uS(x);
and hence an extension of the set of motivationally salient dimensions from
S = f1g to S = f1; 2g can also lead to the same preference reversal between
x and y. Of course, real-world cases are more complex. Among other things,
the positions of parties or policy alternatives may change over and above the
change in motivationally salient dimensions, but the basic mechanism should
be clear. As famously argued by Riker (1986), a clever political manipu-
lator who manages to inuence the perceived salience of various political
dimensions can make use of such a mechanism to gain support for his or
her position in the general electorate, a legislature or a committee (see also
McLean 2001).
Our second example concerns preferences over consumer goods, such as
cars, which may be evaluated, for instance, on the dimensions of convenience
and energy e¢ ciency. Before the issue of climate change and thereby the
energy dimension became politically salient, many consumers preferred big
cars, such as SUVs, to small cars, on the grounds of convenience or luxury.
In the recent past, however, consumer preferences in both the United States
and Europe have signicantly changed, and small cars have suddenly become
much more popular, while SUVs have gone out of fashion. One way to explain
this preference change is by referring to a shift in the motivationally salient
dimension from the convenience dimension to the energy one. This preference
change cannot be reduced to information learning alone: SUVs have been
known to be gas-guzzling all along, and they also remain as convenient as
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ever. Of course, there is also the fact of rising energy costs, but presumably
one can identify a preference change in recent years even when controlling
for the cost of petrol.
Figure 2: Consumer preferences
Figure 2 provides a stylized illustration of this scenario. The gure shows
a two-dimensional space in which di¤erent cars between which a consumer
can choose, such as x and y, are located. Dimension 1 might represent con-
venience, dimension 2 energy e¢ ciency. Car x, the SUV, scores highly on
convenience but badly on energy e¢ ciency, and car y, the small car, has
the opposite characteristics. We assume that, for each dimension j, the con-
sumers value function vj on locations on that dimension is linearly increasing
(for simplicity, we assume that it is given by vj(xj) = xj, but other, more so-
phisticated functional forms are possible, as discussed in section 5). Again,
we begin by looking at the case in which only dimension 1 is motivation-
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ally salient for the consumer, i.e., S = f1g. Since x scores more highly on
dimension 1 than y does, i.e., x1 > y1, we have
uS(x) = v1(x1) = x1 > y1 = v1(y1) = uS(y),
whence x S y.
On the other hand, if only dimension 2 is motivationally salient, i.e.,
S = f2g, then y scores more highly than x does, i.e., y2 > x2, and thus
uS(y) = v2(y2) = y2 > x2 = v2(x2) = uS(x),
which implies y S x. As in the earlier example, a change in the set of moti-
vationally salient dimensions from S = f1g to S = f2g leads to a preference
reversal between x and y. It is also easy to see that, if both dimensions are
motivationally salient, i.e., S = f1; 2g, we get y S x as well, since
uS(y) = v1(y1) + v2(y2) = y1 + y2 > x1 + x2 = v1(x1) + v2(x2) = uS(x).
Once again, real-world cases are likely to be more complex, but our example
should illustrate, in a particularly distilled form, the basic mechanism that
is in operation in a broad range of cases.
5 Areas of application
So far we have only given relatively simple examples of individual prefer-
ences consistent with our model of preference change and the conditions
of our representation theorem. In particular, everything has been linear in
these examples. It is therefore worth going through some widely recognized,
more realistic types of preferences in political and economic contexts, in or-
der to see whether they also t the conditions of our theorem. If they do,
as we show, this underlines the wide applicability of our model to many
standard social-scientic phenomena. We begin by looking at distance-based
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preferences, which are familiar from spatial voting theory; we then turn to
Cobb-Douglas preferences from the theory of consumer choice; and nally,
we consider constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences, also orig-
inally from consumer theory. The latter two kinds of preferences, however,
are also relevant well beyond consumer theory. Cobb-Douglas preferences,
for example, have been used in areas as far removed from consumer theory as
international relations, to model the preferences of state actors over bundles
of di¤erent goods (e.g., military goods versus civilian goods) (Oren 1994),
and CES preferences have been used in the area of environmental politics, to
model the idea that people have a constant elasticity of substitution between
income and environmental quality, which a¤ects their willingness to support
environmental policies (Jackson 1983).
5.1 Distance-based preferences
Distance-based preferences capture the idea that an agent has a most pre-
ferred alternative, such as a most preferred policy platform or a most pre-
ferred election candidate, and prefers other alternatives less as they get more
distantfrom that most preferred preference. Accordingly, alternatives are
represented by points in a multidimensional space X = Rk endowed with
some distance metric. The space might contain all possible policy positions,
and the metric could be the standard Euclidean metric or another, more
general one.
Formally, a distance-based preference order is represented by a utility
function U : X ! R according to which the utility of an alternative decreases
with increasing distance from the agents most preferred alternative or ideal
point. For each x 2 X,
U(x) =  
 
kX
j=1
ajjxj   zjjp
!1=p
,
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where z = (z1; :::; zk) is the agents most preferred alternative or ideal point
in X, aj  0 is the weight assigned to each dimension j, and p  1 is the
parameter specifying the degreeof the metric, often chosen to be 1 (for the
Hammingor city-blockdistance) or 2 (for the Euclideandistance).11
Suppose now, in our model, the preference order S is induced by the
utility function
US(x) =  
 X
j2S
ajjxj   zjjp
!1=p
,
which captures the natural idea that salient dimensions have positive weight,
while non-salient dimensions have zero weight. Then our two axioms are
clearly satised: The strictly increasing transformation t 7!  ( t)p, which
preserves the induced preference order S, converts US(x) into an additive
utility function
uS(x) =
X
j2S
vj(xj),
with each value function vj given by vj(xj) =  ajjxj   zjjp. This is precisely
of the form described in theorem 1. Thus our model of preference change
is applicable, for example, to standard spatial voting contexts, where it can
explain such phenomena as Rikerian heresthetics or partisan realignment, as
illustrated in Miller and Schoelds (2003) case study and our simple example
above.
5.2 Cobb-Douglas preferences
While distance-based preferences are based on the existence of a (nite) most
preferred alternative, we now turn to two classes of preferences which capture
the idea that more is betterin each dimension, as commonly assumed in
11In the special case of equal weights aj = 1, the utility function U(x) reduces to
 kx  zkp, where kk is the p-norm.
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consumer theory and illustrated in our stylized example of consumer prefer-
ences over cars. In this subsection, we discuss Cobb-Douglas preferences, and
in the next constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences. As noted above,
such preferences are also relevant well beyond consumer theory narrowly
construed. The assumption that more is better is plausible not only for
dimensions representing consumption, but also for ones representing health,
recognition by colleagues, a¤ection by friends, wine quality etc. Even sym-
pathetic or other-regarding preferences, as famously discussed by Sen (1977),
fall into this category: Each dimension j 2 D could represent the welfare of
one particular individual among a set of k individuals named 1; 2; :::; k, and
the weightof each dimension, as formally dened in a moment, captures
how much the agent represented by our model cares about that individual.
A Cobb-Douglas preference order is dened on the space of alternatives
X = (0;1)k and represented by the utility function U : X ! R according
to which the utility of an alternative is a weighted product of its position on
each dimension. Formally, for each x 2 X,
U(x) =
kY
j=1
x
aj
j ,
where aj  0 is the weight assigned to each dimension j.
Suppose, in our model, the preference order S is induced by the utility
function
US(x) =
Y
j2S
x
aj
j ,
again with the inbuilt stipulation than non-salient dimensions have zero
weight. Then our two axioms are once again satised: The strictly increasing
transformation t 7! log t converts US(x) into an additive utility function
uS(x) =
X
j2S
vj(xj),
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with each value function vj given by vj(xj) = aj lnxj, consistently with
theorem 1. This shows that, as in our stylized example of preference change
over cars, our model can explain the change of standard consumer preferences
through changes in the salience of dimensions.
5.3 Constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences
While Cobb-Douglas preferences are initially dened by a multiplicative
utility function, constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences have a
more explicitly additive form. They are dened on the space of alternatives
X = [0;1)k (the only di¤erence to the Cobb-Douglas case being the inclu-
sion of the zero margin) and represented by the utility function U : X ! R
according to which the utility of an alternative is essentially the distance
from the zero point, as dened by an appropriate (generalized) metric.12 For
each x 2 X,
U(x) =
 
kX
j=1
ajx
p
j
!1=p
,
where, as before, aj  0 is the weight assigned to each dimension j and
p > 0 is a parameter (interpretable as the degreeof the generalized metric),
which is often chosen to be less than or equal to 1, so as to dene a convex
preference order.13
If, in our model, the preference order S is induced by the utility function
US(x) =
 X
j2S
ajx
p
j
!1=p
,
once more with the inbuilt stipulation than non-salient dimensions have zero
weight, then our two axioms hold, because the strictly increasing transfor-
12To be precise, the generalized metric becomes a proper metric when p  1.
13In the special case of equal weights aj = 1, the utility function U(x) reduces to kxkp,
where kk is the p-norm.
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mation t 7! tp converts US(x) into a proper additive utility function
uS(x) =
X
j2S
vj(xj);
with each value function vj given by vj(xj) = ajx
p
j , as required. This com-
pletes our illustration that several standard classes of preferences familiar
from the social sciences are compatible with our model of non-informational
preference change.
6 Reintroducing uncertainty
At rst sight, it may appear that uncertainty the agents lack of complete in-
formation about which fundamental alternatives or outcomes will result from
his or her choices has been banned from our model. Indeed, so far, nothing
in our model is probabilistic. While the agents preferences can change as a
result of changes in his or her set of motivationally salient dimensions, prob-
abilities do not come into play anywhere, and hence there appears to be no
scope for representing uncertainty or information-driven preference change.
Contrary to this appearance, we now want to show that our model has the
full exibility to represent those classical phenomena as well. In short, our
model is a proper generalization of a paradigmatic standard model of rational
choice, in so far as it can capture both informational and non-informational
preference change.
To reintroduce uncertainty into our model, we make a theoretical move
common in decision theory. We assume that the agents preference order is
dened not merely over the alternatives in the set X, but over all possible
lotteries on X. Each such lottery captures one particular (subjective) prob-
ability distribution over the alternatives in X. Di¤erent lotteries could thus
represent either di¤erent possible choices the agent can make, which might
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have di¤erent likely consequences, or di¤erent beliefs about what the likely
consequences of a single choice might be.
Let L(X) denote the set of all possible lotteries, i.e., probability distrib-
utions, on X, for simplicity restricted to those with nite support,14 and let
~S denote the agents preference order (a reexive, transitive and complete
binary relation) over L(X), for any set of motivationally salient dimensions
S  D. As is standard, we assume that ~S is representable by the expecta-
tion of some utility function from X into R.
The order ~S naturally induces a preference order S over the original
set of alternatives X, interpreted as the set of surelotteries assigning prob-
ability 1 to a single element of X. We assume that the induced preference
order S is continuous, as before.
Can we obtain a representation theorem similar to our earlier theorem,
which applies to preference orders over lotteries? The following result holds.
Theorem 2 Suppose there are three or more e¤ective dimensions in D.
Then the agents preference orders ~S across all possible S  D satisfy
axioms 1 and 2 (restricted to X) if and only if there exist continuous value
functions v1 : X1 ! R, v2 : X2 ! R, ..., vk : Xk ! R such that, for any
set of motivationally salient dimensions S  D, ~S is representable by the
expectation of a utility function ~uS = S  uS, where
 uS : X ! R is of the additive form uS(x) =
P
j2S
vj(xj) for each x 2 X,
 S : uS(X)! R is a strictly increasing transformation.15
14Of course, the result to be presented could be generalized further to include the case
of innite support.
15The set uS(X) on which S is dened is an interval (by the continuity of uS and the
connectedness of X), but the image of S need not be an interval (as S need not be
continuous).
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This theorem is a natural extension of our earlier theorem. While in the
earlier, non-probabilistic case the agents preference order S for each set of
motivationally salient dimensions S is directly representable by an additive
utility function uS, in the probabilistic case the preference order ~S is rep-
resentable by the expectation of a composite function ~uS = S  uS. This
function, in turn, results from the application of a strictly increasing transfor-
mation S to an underlying additive utility function uS. The transformation
S can be interpreted as reecting the agents risk attitude for each S  D.
Typically, S is concave, convex, or a¢ ne (i.e., of the form z 7! az + b)
depending on whether the agent is risk averse, risk loving, or risk neutral.
Note that this representation is still quite permissive. It allows not only
every possible choice of continuous value functions v1; v2; :::; vk within the
underlying additive utility function uS,16 but also every possible choice of
strictly increasing transformations S across S  D to represent the agents
risk attitudes. In particular, the transformations S (for S  D) need not
even be continuous, and they can also depend on the set of motivationally
salient dimensions S. Thus it is perfectly consistent with our axioms, for
instance, that the agent is risk loving for some sets of motivationally salient
dimensions and risk averse for others. However, if the satisfaction of axioms
1 and 2 is extended to the set of all lotteries L(X) (rather than restricted
to X), the transformations S are all constrained to be positive a¢ ne and
can thus be dropped, so that the representation in theorem 2 reduces to the
exact counterpart of the one in theorem 1 above.
Now it is easy to see how uncertainty and information-driven preference
change can be represented in our model, along with non-informational pref-
erence change, i.e., preference change from a gain or loss in motivationally
salient dimensions. The agents preference order over some choice options
16The existence of three or more e¤ective dimensions merely requires that at least three
of the functions v1; :::; vk are non-constant.
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changes as a result of new information whenever the agent revises the lotter-
ies by which he or she represents those options. Ordinarily, this revision is
done through Bayesian updating: The relevant probability distributions after
learning the new information are obtained from the ones before learning it
via Bayess rule (or a suitable generalization of it), as in standard rational
choice theory.
The key lesson of our extended representation theorem, however, is that
our model retains the conceptual resources of standard rational choice theory,
while also capturing the hitherto unrecognized possibility of non-informational
preference change.
7 Concluding remarks
Folk psychology has long recognized the possibility of non-informational pref-
erence change. Indeed, none of the examples of non-informational preference
change given in this paper should strike a non-academic reader (or indeed
a successful politician who understands how political preferences can be af-
fected by issue salience) as particularly surprising or controversial. And yet,
standard rational choice theory setting aside some of the notable exceptions
cited in our introduction adamently denies the possibility of this kind of
preference change, proposing instead that every instance of preference change
should be explained in purely informational terms. Even a very sophisticated
review of political-science research on preference formation, which acknowl-
edges the challenges that, for example, Tversky and Kahnemans ndings
on framing e¤ects pose for classical rational choice theory, shows little will-
ingness to give up the assumption that preference changes must always be
information-driven:
For the many substantive domains in which information changes
do not induce preference change, no external validity is sacriced
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by using the traditional modeling assumptions. (Druckman and
Lupia 2000, p. 13).
Although the question of how far the kind of preference change we have dis-
cussed here can be remodelled informationally deserves more comprehensive
treatment (which we provide elsewhere), we wish to make two immediate
remarks in response to it.
Firstly, there are some formal barriers to remodelling what we describe as
non-informational preference change within the standard model of rational
choice. For a start, is it di¢ cult to capture the kind of preference change
associated, for instance, with dynamic inconsistency or the loss of salient
dimensions in standard terms (because their modelling would involve a vio-
lation of classical Bayesian rationality), while they do not create any special
di¢ culties in our model. In addition, any informational remodelling of such
preference change requires an enrichment of the space of alternatives or states
of the world over which the agent is assumed to hold beliefs and preferences.
Thus the cost of keeping the assumption of xed underlying preferences is
the inated and often unnaturally complex ontology of alternatives or states
of the world that must be ascribed to the agent.
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, a good theory of ratio-
nal choice ought to be psychologically plausible, and this is where, in our
view, the key strength of our model lies. Many frequently observed instances
of apparently non-informational preference change can be explained by our
model in extremely natural terms, as we hope to have illustrated. Phenom-
ena which, from a classical vantage point, may come across as signicant
violations of rationality and require a major explanatory stretch, reemerge
in our model as natural consequences of a change in the agents set of moti-
vationally salient dimensions.
Why, then, is there such a strong insistence on xed underlying prefer-
ences in standard rational choice theory? We suspect that this simply stems
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from the lack of an elegant and parsimonious model that preserves the many
important and powerful insights of standard rational choice theory while
also capturing the possibility that certain non-informational experiences or
psychological or physiological changes may a¤ect an agents preferences as
well. We hope that the present paper contributes to lling this gap in the
literature.
Where should the present model be taken from here? Obvious exten-
sions and generalizations of the model include the introduction of degrees of
salience (as opposed to the present on-o¤ notion of salience), the representa-
tion of discrete (e.g., binary) characteristics of alternatives (as opposed to the
present focus on continuous characteristics), the consideration of weaker ax-
ioms (so as to obtain representation theorems that are more permissive than
our present main theorem) and the representation of more general forms of
bias, limited imagination or limited conceptualization in how an agent forms
his or her preferences over a given space of alternatives. All of these are the
subject of ongoing further work.
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A Proofs of the theorems
Recall that X1; :::; Xk are connected topological spaces (k > 0), X is their
Cartesian product, and D = f1; :::; kg is the set of dimensions.
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
LetS, S  D, be orders (i.e., reexive, transitive and connected binary rela-
tions) on X that are further continuous with respect to the product topology
on X. We present three key steps of our proof as lemmas. (These lem-
mas require neither the continuity assumption, nor even that the sets Xj are
connected topological spaces; they could be arbitrary sets.)
Lemma 1 Assume axiom 2. For all sets of salient dimensions S  D and
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alternatives x; y 2 X, if xDnS = yDnS then x S y , x D y.
Proof of lemma 1. Assume axiom 2 and let S  D and x; y 2 X with
xDnS = yDnS. As the equivalence x S y , x D y holds trivially if S = D,
let us assume that S ( D. As D is nite, a nitely repeated application
of axiom 2 yields a nested sequence of sets S = S1 ( S2 ( ::: ( Sm = D
(2  m < 1) such that x Sk y , x Sk+1 y for each k 2 f1; :::;m   1g.
Hence x S y , x D y. 
For any set S  D, any s 2 j2SXj and any t 2 j2DnSXj, we write (s; t)
to denote the vector x 2 X given by xS = s and xDnS = t, i.e., the vector
that coincides with s and t on the dimensions in S and DnS, respectively.
Lemma 2 Assume axioms 1 and 2. Then x S y , (xS; zDnS) D (yS; zDnS)
for all alternatives x; y; z 2 X and sets of salient dimensions S  D.
Proof of lemma 2. Assume axioms 1 and 2 and let x; y; z 2 X and S  D.
By axiom 1,
x S (xS; zDnS) and y S (yS; zDnS). ()
By lemma 1, (xS; zDnS) D (yS; zDnS) is equivalent to (xS; zDnS) S
(yS; zDnS), which by (*) and the transitivity of S is equivalent to x S y.

As usual, we call an order  on X separable if, for every set S  D, all
s; s0 2 j2SXj and all t; t0 2 j2DnSXj, we have (s; t)  (s0; t) , (s; t0) 
(s0; t0) (i.e., if for all S  D the way in which the subspace j2SXj is ordered
given that we x the coordinates on the dimensions in DnS does not depend
on how these coordinates are xed).
Lemma 3 Assume axioms 1 and 2. The full-salience order D is separable.
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Proof of lemma 3. Assume axioms 1 and 2. Consider any S  D, s; s0 2
j2SXj and t; t0 2 j2DnSXj. We have to show that (s; t) D (s0; t) ,
(s; t0) D (s0; t0). This equivalence holds because, choosing arbitrary x; y 2 X
with xS = s and yS = s0, each side of it is equivalent to x S y by lemma 2.

Assume now that at least three dimensions in D are e¤ective. Firstly,
the reader may easily check that if the preference orders S, S  D, have
the specied additive form, then they obey both axioms 1 and 2 (and would
do so even without our assumptions of continuity and the e¤ectiveness of at
least three dimensions).
Conversely, assume axioms 1 and 2. Each e¤ective dimension j 2 D is
essential under the full-salience order D, i.e., there is a non-indi¤erence
x 6D y for at least one pair x; y 2 X with xDnfjg = yDnfjg. To see why this
is the case, recall that js e¤ectiveness implies existence of a pair x; y 2 X
with x 6fjg y, which by lemma 2 entails x0 6D y0 where x0 := (xfjg; zDnfjg)
and y0 := (yfjg; zDnfjg) for an arbitrarily chosen z 2 X. So, since at least
three dimensions j are e¤ective, at least three dimensions are essential under
D. Moreover, D is separable by lemma 3 and continuous by assumption.
So, by Wakkers (1988) strengthened version of Debreus (1960) additive
representation theorem,17 there exist continuous functions vj : Xj ! R,
j 2 D, such that
x D y ,
X
j2D
vj(xj) 
X
j2D
vj(yj) for all x; y 2 X. (1)
17Debreus (1960) original theorem uses an additional assumption (each Xj has a count-
able topologically dense subset), which is removed by Wakker (1988) (and earlier by Krantz
et al. 1971, yet without proving the continuity of the functions in the representation).
32
We now need to show that, for all S  D and x; y 2 X, x S y is equivalent
to X
j2S
vj(xj) 
X
j2S
vj(yj). (2)
Consider any S  D and x; y 2 X. Fix an arbitrary z 2 X. By lemma 2,
x S y is equivalent to (xS; zDnS) D (yS; zDnS), which by (1) is equivalent
to X
j2S
vj(xj) +
X
j2DnS
vj(zj) 
X
j2S
vj(yj) +
X
j2DnS
vj(zj),
and hence (by cancelling out) to (2), as required. 
A.2 Proof of theorem 2
Our proof of theorem 2 draws on theorem 1. Recall that ~S, S  D, are
orders on the set L(X) of lotteries (i.e., probability distributions with nite
support) over X. Each ~S is assumed to be representable by the expectation
of some function X ! R. Identifying alternatives in X with sure lotteries,
we denote by S, S  D, the induced orders on X, which are continuous by
assumption.
Suppose at least three dimensions are e¤ective. Firstly, assume axioms
1 and 2. Then, by the only ifpart of theorem 1, there exist continuous
functions vj : Xj ! R, j 2 D, such that the restriction S of any ~S, S  D,
to the set X of sure lotteries is representable by the function uS : X ! R
given by uS(x) =
P
j2S vj(xj). Let S  D. By assumption, there exists a
function ~uS : X ! R whose expectation represents ~S. In particular, ~uS
represents the restriction S of ~S to X, the set of sure lotteries. So, ~uS
represents the same order S as uS. Hence, ~uS = S  uS for some strictly
increasing function S : uS(X)! R, as required.
Conversely, assume that the orders ~S, S  D, are representable in the
specied way, and let ~uS, S, uS, S  D, be the functions that feature in
33
one such representation. In particular, the restriction S of any ~S to the
set X of sure lotteries is representable by ~uS, hence also by uS (as uS and ~uS
are strictly increasing transformations of each other). So, by the ifpart of
theorem 1, axioms 1 and 2 are satised. 
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